Full Report
If a setting fails in the forest and nobody hears it ...
Analysis Summary
# Vulnerability: Authorization Bypass in Amazon Quick AI Chat Agents
## CVE Details
- **CVE ID**: Not assigned (AWS classified severity as "None" and issued no formal advisory).
- **CVSS Score**: N/A (Internal AWS assessment: 0.0 / Reported by researchers as a significant bypass).
- **CWE**: CWE-285 (Improper Authorization).
## Affected Systems
- **Products**: Amazon Quick (formerly QuickSight / Quick Suite).
- **Versions**: All versions prior to the March 11-12, 2026 patch.
- **Configurations**: Instances where administrators utilized "Custom Permissions" to restrict access to AI Chat Agents.
## Vulnerability Description
A flaw existed in the server-side validation logic of Amazon Quick. While the user interface (UI) correctly honored "Custom Permissions" by hiding the AI Chat Agent feature from unauthorized users, the underlying API failed to perform a corresponding authorization check. Authenticated users within an AWS account could bypass the UI restriction by sending direct HTTP requests to the chat agent's API endpoint. Because Amazon Quick AI agents are grounded in sensitive business data (Slack, Outlook, CRMs, and databases), this allowed unauthorized users to query and retrieve information they were explicitly restricted from accessing.
## Exploitation
- **Status**: PoC available (demonstrated by Fog Security); no known exploitation in the wild.
- **Complexity**: Low (requires knowing the API endpoint).
- **Attack Vector**: Network (Authenticated). An attacker must have valid credentials for the Amazon Quick environment but does not need administrative privileges.
## Impact
- **Confidentiality**: High (Unauthorized access to integrated business data, CRMs, and communications via AI queries).
- **Integrity**: Low (Primarily a read-based bypass through the AI interface).
- **Availability**: None.
## Remediation
### Patches
- **AWS Managed Fix**: AWS deployed a server-side fix between **March 11 and March 12, 2026**. As this is a SaaS/Managed service, no manual patching of infrastructure is required by the customer.
### Workarounds
- **None provided**: AWS stated that because "no customers were actively using" the Admin Control capability during the vulnerable window, no customer action was necessary.
## Detection
- **Indicators of Compromise**: Review CloudTrail or service-specific logs for unexpected `POST` requests to the Quick AI Agent API endpoints originating from users who should not have access to the AI feature.
- **Detection methods and tools**: AWS customers can monitor for "Shadow AI" usage by auditing API calls that bypass the standard Console UI.
## References
- **Fog Security Research**: hxxps[://]www[.]fogsecurity[.]io/blog/authorization-bypass-in-amazon-quick-ai-agents
- **AWS Statement**: "This issue was addressed in March 2026. No customer data was at risk and there is no customer action required."