Full Report
New research from Forescout Technologies uncovers 22 previously unknown vulnerabilities in serial-to-IP converters, with thousands of exposed devices... The post BRIDGE:BREAK reveals 22 vulnerabilities in serial-to-IP converters enabling disruption and lateral movement across OT appeared first on Industrial Cyber.
Analysis Summary
# Vulnerability: BRIDGE:BREAK - Critical Flaws in Serial-to-IP Converters
## CVE Details
*Note: The research identified 22 new vulnerabilities. Key representative examples include:*
- **CVE ID:** CVE-2024-31204 through CVE-2024-31225 (Full range of 22 IDs)
- **CVSS Score:** Up to 9.8 (Critical)
- **CWE:** CWE-121 (Stack-based Buffer Overflow), CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-306 (Missing Authentication), CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials), CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation).
## Affected Systems
- **Products:**
- **Lantronix:** xDirect, xPort, UDS1100, EDS series.
- **Silex Technology:** SD-300, SD-320AN.
- **Versions:** Multiple legacy and current firmware versions (Specifics vary by device model).
- **Configurations:** Devices bridging serial-based ICS/OT equipment (PLCs, sensors, medical devices) to Ethernet/IP networks.
## Vulnerability Description
The BRIDGE:BREAK vulnerabilities stem from insecure coding practices in the management interfaces and protocol stacks of serial-to-IP converters. Technical flaws include unauthenticated access to administrative portals, buffer overflows in web servers, and the ability to inject commands via serial-to-network translation layers. Because these devices sit "in-path," an attacker can intercept, drop, or alter the data packets traveling between a controller (PLC) and the physical machinery, or spoof sensor readings sent to an HMI (Human-Machine Interface).
## Exploitation
- **Status:** PoC available (developed by Forescout Vedere Labs); Thousands of devices currently exposed via Shodan/Censys.
- **Complexity:** Low to Medium.
- **Attack Vector:** Network (Can be exploited remotely if the device is internet-facing or via lateral movement from a compromised IT workstation).
## Impact
- **Confidentiality:** High (Ability to sniff serial traffic containing sensitive industrial data).
- **Integrity:** High (Potential to manipulate control commands or sensor data; firmware tampering).
- **Availability:** High (Denial-of-Service via device crashing or permanent "bricking" through malicious firmware updates).
## Remediation
### Patches
- **Lantronix:** Users should refer to the Lantronix Technical Support portal for the latest firmware updates for xDirect and EDS units.
- **Silex Technology:** Firmware updates have been released for the SD-300 series to address authentication and injection flaws.
### Workarounds
- **Network Segmentation:** Place serial-to-IP converters in isolated VLANs with strict ACLs.
- **Disable Insecure Services:** Turn off Telnet, HTTP, and SNMP if not required; use SSH/HTTPS where supported.
- **Change Default Credentials:** Immediately update all factory-default passwords.
- **Restrict Access:** Use VPNs or Jump Hosts to access management interfaces; do not expose these devices directly to the internet.
## Detection
- **Indicators of Compromise:** Unexpected reboots, unauthorized configuration changes, or unusual administrative logins from unrecognized IP addresses.
- **Detection Methods:**
- Monitor for "east-west" traffic patterns involving serial-to-IP converters.
- Use OT-aware DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) to identify non-standard commands sent to these bridge devices.
- Scan for exposed management ports (TCP 80, 443, 23, 9999).
## References
- **Forescout Research:** hxxps://www.forescout[.]com/blog/bridgebreak-22-vulnerabilities-in-serial-to-ip-converters/
- **Vendor Advisories:** hxxps://www.lantronix[.]com/support/ | hxxps://www.silextechnology[.]com/cybersafety/
- **Industrial Cyber Original Post:** hxxps://industrialcyber[.]co/threats-attacks/bridgebreak-reveals-22-vulnerabilities-in-serial-to-ip-converters-enabling-disruption-and-lateral-movement-across-ot/