Full Report
During the nearly four years since Russia invaded Ukraine, satellite constellations have been a lifeline for Ukrainian forces, keeping the Internet and the military connected despite ongoing attacks. China has taken notice. With an eye toward future conflicts, the People’s Republic of China has sought for ways to disrupt or jam constellation-satellite networks. In an…
Analysis Summary
# Threat Actor: The People's Republic of China (State-Affiliated Research/Military Planning)
## Attribution & Identity
**Attribution:** The People's Republic of China (PRC).
**Aliases and Associated Groups:** Identified through research conducted by academics at two major Chinese universities, aiming to inform future conflict planning. This indicates a strong alignment with state objectives, even if the research is academic in nature.
## Activity Summary
The core activity described is **research and simulation** focused on mitigating or disrupting capabilities provided by satellite constellation networks, particularly in the context of potential future conflicts. This research was directly observed following the critical role satellite constellations (like Starlink) played in supporting Ukrainian forces during the conflict with Russia.
## Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
The research analyzed the feasibility and required scale for disrupting these networks:
- **Jamming/Disruption:** Research focused on finding ways to jam or disrupt communications provided by constellation-satellite networks.
- **Massed Platform Deployment (Simulated):** To achieve widespread disruption (e.g., jamming signals to a region the size of Taiwan), simulations suggested requiring 1,000 to 2,000 drones.
- **(Implied TTP):** Electronic Warfare against space-based communications infrastructure.
- **MITRE ATT&CK IDs:** Not mentioned in the source material, as this is strategic research rather than active cyber campaign reporting.
## Targeting
- **Sectors:** Space/Satellite Communications, Telecommunications, potentially Military/Defense (as a beneficiary/user of such networks).
- **Geography:** The specific simulation mentioned targeted a region the size of **Taiwan**. The general research interest is prompted by the Ukraine conflict.
- **Victims:** Satellite constellation providers (e.g., Starlink network is explicitly mentioned), and entities reliant on these commercial satellite services for communications.
## Tools & Infrastructure
- **Malware Families Used:** None mentioned. The focus is on kinetic/electronic warfare planning using drones/EW platforms.
- **Infrastructure (C2, Domains, IPs):** None mentioned. The research describes the *attack platform* (drones) and the *target* (satellite signals).
## Implications
The PRC is actively studying ways to deny adversaries access to critical commercial satellite communication infrastructure used for military connectivity (as demonstrated in Ukraine). This indicates a strategic imperative to develop Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities capable of degrading or neutralizing these space assets in a potential future conflict scenario.
## Mitigations
- Increased hardening and resilience measures for commercial and military satellite communication links against jamming and electronic attack.
- Development of countermeasures for massed drone swarm electronic attacks.
- Continued monitoring of Chinese research publications related to novel EW techniques targeting LEO/MEO constellations.