Full Report
As the nation’s cyber defense agency and the national coordinator for critical infrastructure security and resilience, the U.S.... The post CISA’s Easterly outlines plan against PRC cyber threats, pushes tech vendors to adopt secure-by-design products appeared first on Industrial Cyber.
Analysis Summary
# Threat Actor: PRC State-Sponsored Cyber Actors (General Categorization)
## Attribution & Identity
**Attribution:** People’s Republic of China (PRC).
**Aliases/Groups Mentioned:** Actors associated with the campaigns 'Salt Typhoon' and 'Volt Typhoon'. No specific APT group names (other than the state sponsor) are detailed in the summary, just the attribution to PRC cyber actors.
## Activity Summary
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and partners have been intensely focused over the past two years on deterring cyber aggression from PRC actors targeting U.S. critical infrastructure. This activity includes:
1. **Espionage:** Exemplified by the 'Salt Typhoon' campaign targeting telecommunication providers.
2. **Disruption/Destruction:** Exemplified by the 'Volt Typhoon' campaign, aimed at disrupting or destroying sensitive critical infrastructure.
CISA has actively detected and evicted these actors from victim networks, although it is acknowledged that these discoveries represent only a small portion of the overall threat. The intent is persistent across multiple vectors (espionage, disruption).
## Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
- Use of **living-off-the-land methods** to evade detection by hiding activity within native operating system processes.
- Intrusion methods involve exploiting **vulnerable devices**.
- The overall TTP profile suggests broad persistence and collection efforts aimed at critical infrastructure systems.
- *MITRE ATT&CK IDs are not explicitly provided in the text.*
## Targeting
**Sectors:**
- Critical Infrastructure (General)
- Telecommunications
- Energy
- Transportation
- Water
**Geography:** United States (Nationwide, with regional teams stationed in every state working with systemically important entities).
**Victims:** U.S. telecommunication providers (mentioned specifically in context of Salt Typhoon); various critical infrastructure entities across energy, transportation, and water sectors.
## Tools & Infrastructure
**Malware Families Used:** Not explicitly named, but campaigns 'Salt Typhoon' and 'Volt Typhoon' are mentioned.
**Infrastructure (C2, domains, IPs):** No specific indicators (IPs, domains) are provided that can be defanged.
## Implications
The threat posed by PRC cyber actors is assessed as **real and persistent**, with expectations that these activities will continue evolving through 2025 and beyond. The focus on critical infrastructure suggests an intent by the PRC state to potentially cause significant disruption or gather long-term intelligence necessary for disruptive actions against national interests. The persistence of the threat necessitates a transition toward **deterrence by denial** (secure products) backed by **deterrence by punishment**.
## Mitigations
1. **Eviction and Response:** CISA assists victims in identifying and evicting PRC actors from networks via hunt and incident response teams.
2. **Vulnerability Reduction:** Organizations should enroll in CISA services, particularly **Vulnerability Scanning**, to identify and reduce vulnerabilities being actively exploited.
3. **Resilience & Governance:** CEOs and business leaders must recognize cyber risk as business risk, expect disruption, and continually test system continuity.
4. **Secure by Design:** Technology manufacturers must adhere to **Secure by Design guidance** to ensure products are safe by design and defective products are eliminated from critical infrastructure systems.
5. **Collective Action:** Sustained collaboration through initiatives like the **Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC)** to enhance ecosystem-level visibility and defense planning.