Full Report
2024-12-24 • NTT Security Holdings • NTT Security Holdings • js.beavertail, py.invisibleferret Open article on Malpedia
Analysis Summary
The provided article context only contains metadata, related articles, and links, but lacks the detailed technical description required to fully populate the TTP summary template. Specifically, the context lists:
* Date: 2024-12-24
* Author/Organization: NTT Security Holdings
* References to other entries: `js.beavertail`, `py.invisibleferret`, and an analysis of a "PowGoop variant."
However, none of this provides descriptive content about a specific tool, malware, or technique to summarize according to the requested structure.
**Therefore, based solely on the provided CONTEXT snippet, a detailed summary cannot be generated.**
If the intent was to summarize the **PowGoop variant** mentioned in the related article reference, the necessary technical details are missing from the current context.
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*(If the context were fully provided, the output would follow the structure below. Since it's empty, I will use the most prominent mentioned item, **PowGoop**, as a placeholder, though the detail level will be minimal based on the available reference)*
# Tool/Technique: PowGoop Variant (Mentioned in Related Content)
## Overview
This entry refers to a specific variant of the PowGoop malware family, analyzed by NTT Security Holdings, which was seemingly used by an Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT).
## Technical Details
- Type: Malware family (PowerShell/Script-based)
- Platform: Windows (Likely)
- Capabilities: Command and control, execution of further stages (inferred from typical APT toolsets).
- First Seen: 2020 (Control servers dating back to this period, mentioned in the related article header).
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
*(Mapping requires detailed technical analysis not present in the context)*
- TBD
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
- Inferred: Establishing persistence and communication with C2 infrastructure.
### Advanced Features
- Inferred: Features related to evasion or specific execution techniques tied to the E400 APT profile.
## Indicators of Compromise
- File Hashes: N/A
- File Names: N/A
- Registry Keys: N/A
- Network Indicators: Dozens of Control Servers identified dating back to 2020 (Specific addresses not provided in context, hence none listed here).
- Behavioral Indicators: N/A
## Associated Threat Actors
- Iranian APTs (Specifically associated with the "E400" designation in the linked article snippet).
## Detection Methods
- N/A
## Mitigation Strategies
- N/A
## Related Tools/Techniques
- PowGoop (Base family)