Full Report
VIGINUM reveals that Azerbaijan state propaganda is seeking to challenge French sovereignty in French overseas territories
Analysis Summary
# Threat Actor: Baku Initiative Group (BIG)
## Attribution & Identity
The threat actor is identified as the **Baku Initiative Group (BIG)**, which is described as a **state-sponsored organization based in Azerbaijan**. The activities were reported by France’s agency for monitoring foreign digital interference, VIGINUM.
## Activity Summary
VIGINUM observed BIG-linked social media accounts disseminating **content resolutely hostile to France** between July 2023 and October 2024. The campaigns sought to leverage significant events, such as the **riots in New Caledonia in May 2024**, to push their narratives. Tactics evolved to promote the signing of memoranda with independence parties in French overseas territories and enhance ties with pan-African spheres, seemingly as a response to suppression of their accounts on X (formerly Twitter). Despite these efforts, VIGINUM concluded that BIG **failed to achieve expected visibility** among residents of overseas French constituencies and Corsica.
## Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
- Dissemination of partisan content via social media accounts linked to BIG.
- Use of **artificial amplification procedures** on X accounts (implying bot or coordinated inauthentic behavior).
- Instrumentalization of public debate in overseas France to serve Azerbaijani foreign policy objectives.
- Evolution of tactics following platform suppression, including exploiting influencer networks.
- **Note:** No specific MITRE ATT&CK IDs were provided in the source material.
## Targeting
- Sectors: Not explicitly stated (The activity is focused on information operations/influence rather than specific corporate sectors).
- Geography: **France’s overseas constituencies and Corsica**.
- Victims: The general public and political discourse within the targeted French territories.
## Tools & Infrastructure
- **Platform Used:** X (formerly Twitter).
- **Infrastructure:** Social media accounts linked to BIG, which experienced suppression forcing tactical shifts.
- **Malware families used:** None mentioned (The operation is focused on influence operations, not typically malware deployment).
- **URLs/IPs:** No specific URLs or IPs were provided/defanged in the source narrative.
## Implications
BIG functions as a **state propaganda outlet working against France**. The primary implication is a persistent, state-backed influence operation targeting specific regions of France (overseas territories and Corsica) to undermine French influence and potentially sow internal division, aligning with Azerbaijani foreign policy goals.
## Mitigations
- Increased monitoring and analysis of social media activity originating from or related to the Baku Initiative Group (BIG).
- Vigilance regarding content disseminating narratives hostile to France, particularly following sensitive events like riots or political developments in overseas territories.
- Analyzing and counteracting attempts at artificial amplification on social media platforms.