Full Report
In an exclusive interview for the Hall of Fame series, Industrial Cyber spoke with Sarah Freeman, chief engineer... The post Hall of Fame – Industrial Cybersecurity Engineer Sarah Freeman appeared first on Industrial Cyber.
Analysis Summary
# Main Topic
Summary of insights and experiences from industrial cybersecurity expert Sarah Freeman, Chief Engineer at MITRE's Cyber Infrastructure Protection Innovation Center (CIPIC), focusing on advancing security solutions for U.S. critical infrastructure, particularly through the lens of her foundational work on Consequence-Driven Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE).
## Key Points
- Freeman's current focus is on predictive adversary analysis and evaluating the effectiveness of security solutions to deter adversaries, contrasting with solely focusing on preventing intrusion.
- Her work is heavily rooted in Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE), a methodology designed to address cyber-enabled sabotage assuming adversaries are already present and potentially stealthy.
- CCE shifts focus from solely preventing initial access to mitigating the impact of sophisticated, adaptive adversaries already within the systems.
- Freeman gained early insights into cyber economics and attacker incentives by tracking activities in the Russian criminal underground during her initial threat intelligence work in the financial sector.
- Future projections suggest an "arms race" involving AI-based tooling used by threat actors to automate attacks, leading to rapid weaponization of vulnerabilities and an untenability of traditional patching cycles.
- The necessity for defenders to adopt automated patch management and AI defenses, while fundamentally shifting focus toward preserving the "minimally viable process" using "break glass" solutions during contested operations.
## Threat Actors
- General focus on "highly resourced, adaptive adversaries" capable of cyber sabotage within critical infrastructure.
- Early experience involved tracking activities within the "Russian criminal underground."
- No specific named threat actor groups are detailed, but the analysis centers on sophisticated, persistent adversaries.
## TTPs
- **Adversary Simulation/Analysis:** Predictive adversary analysis is key to Freeman's current research.
- **Cyber-Enabled Sabotage:** The threat model assumes immediate operational impact rather than waiting for data breaches.
- **Future Weaponization:** Expectation of increased speed in the weaponization of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities due to rising threat actor automation.
- **Disruption Tactic (Mitigation focus):** Critical infrastructure operators must deploy "break glass solutions" to maintain the means to disrupt active adversary action in critical networks.
## Affected Systems
- Critical Infrastructure (CI) systems, including Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Operational Technology (OT).
- Specific engineering domains mentioned include: instrumentation and controls (I&C), power, chemical, and nuclear systems.
- The methodology is designed to protect vital functions and processes within these sectors.
## Mitigations
- **CCE Implementation:** Integrating security into engineering workflows to protect functions from sabotage.
- **Operational Resilience:** Shifting emphasis to "learning to operate within this contested space" by defining and preserving the **minimally viable process**.
- **Emergency Preparedness:** Deployment of "break glass solutions" and other emergency technologies to ensure the ability to disrupt active adversary action.
- **Automation Adoption:** Defenders must deploy AI technologies and automate patch management to counter the increasing speed of AI-driven attacks.
- **Post-Incident Collaboration:** Open dialogue among CI operators regarding what defenses succeeded and failed following compromises.
## Conclusion
The industrial cybersecurity landscape is rapidly evolving towards a high-speed, AI-driven conflict where detection may become unreliable. The key takeaway from Sarah Freeman's work is the necessary strategic pivot from pure prevention toward resilience, defining essential operational outcomes (minimally viable process), and pre-planning emergency disruption capabilities to manage inevitable compromises in critical infrastructure.