Full Report
A set of nine malicious NuGet packages has been identified as capable of dropping time-delayed payloads to sabotage database operations and corrupt industrial control systems. According to software supply chain security company Socket, the packages were published in 2023 and 2024 by a user named "shanhai666" and are designed to run malicious code after specific trigger dates in August 2027 and
Analysis Summary
# Tool/Technique: Malicious NuGet Packages (Logic Bombs)
## Overview
A set of nine malicious NuGet packages published between 2023 and 2024 by user "shanhai666." These packages contain logic bombs designed to execute destructive payloads targeting database operations and Industrial Control Systems (ICS)/Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) after predefined future trigger dates (August 2027 and November 2028).
## Technical Details
- Type: Malware/Supply Chain Compromise (Logic Bomb)
- Platform: .NET/Windows environments running applications utilizing these NuGet packages (targeting database systems and ICS).
- Capabilities: Drop time-delayed payloads; sabotage database operations; corrupt ICS/PLCs; immediate random process termination; silent write failures to PLCs.
- First Seen: Packages published in 2023 and 2024.
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
This summary maps the observed behaviors and delivery mechanisms based on the available context.
- **TA0001 - Initial Access**
- T1195 - Supply Chain Compromise
- T1195.002 - Compromise Software Supply Chain: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **TA0003 - Persistence**
- T1548.002 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (Implied via library injection upon standard application operation)
- **TA0004 - Privilege Escalation** (Not explicitly detailed, but potential if executed in application context)
- **TA0011 - Command and Control** (Not explicitly detailed, but implied if future payloads require C2)
- **TA0012 - Execution**
- T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter (Via weaponized C# extension methods)
- T1610 - Supply Chain Anomaly (Detection/Trigger mechanism) (Future action)
- **TA0020 - Impact**
- T1485 - Data Destruction (Implied by sabotage/corruption)
- T1498 - Service Interruption (Process termination)
- T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact (Not explicitly stated, but corruption is mentioned)
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
1. **Logic Bomb Activation:** Malicious code remains dormant until hardcoded future dates (e.g., August 8, 2027, November 29, 2028) are reached.
2. **Weaponized Extension Methods:** Malicious code is injected using C# extension methods, ensuring automatic execution whenever standard operations (database queries or PLC operations) take place.
3. **Application Termination:** After the trigger date, the compromised application process is terminated with a 20% probability per execution. (For `Sharp7Extend`, this runs until June 6, 2028).
4. **Sabotage Database Operations/ICS:** Target database systems (SQL Server, PostgreSQL, SQLite) and Siemens S7 PLCs.
### Advanced Features
1. **PLC Sabotage (`Sharp7Extend`):** Implements silent write failures to the PLC 80% of the time, occurring after a randomized delay of 30 to 90 minutes post-installation. This mechanism operates in tandem with the process termination mechanism once the grace period passes.
2. **Staggered Activation:** The use of multiple trigger dates across different packages allows the actor to maintain a low-profile presence and disrupt victims over an extended timeframe.
3. **Trust Building:** The packages largely function as advertised (9 out of 12 total packages published by the user), lending them a false sense of legitimacy to downstream developers.
## Indicators of Compromise
*Note: No specific hashes or network artifacts were provided in the context.*
- File Hashes: [Not available in context]
- File Names: [Associated packages: MyDbRepository, MCDbRepository, Sharp7Extend, SqlDbRepository, SqlRepository, SqlUnicornCoreTest, SqlUnicornCore, SqlUnicorn.Core, SqlLiteRepository]
- Registry Keys: [Not available in context]
- Network Indicators: [Not available in context]
- Behavioral Indicators: Execution of applications utilizing installed packages unexpectedly failing, terminating processes randomly, or exhibiting write failures during PLC communication after installation.
## Associated Threat Actors
- Adversary: Unknown, possibly of Chinese origin, suggested by the publisher name "shanhai666."
- This campaign utilizes sophisticated techniques rarely combined in NuGet supply chain attacks.
## Detection Methods
- Signature-based detection: Rules targeting the presence of the identified package names or specific internal code signatures related to the time-check logic.
- Behavioral detection: Monitoring for unexpected, periodic, or time-based termination of applications utilizing database or PLC libraries, especially if linked to application library calls.
- YARA rules: Could be developed to detect the specific weaponized C# extension method injection pattern.
## Mitigation Strategies
- **Dependency Verification:** Scrutinize downloaded dependencies, especially from lesser-known publishers or those exhibiting unusual update patterns.
- **Supply Chain Security Tools:** Employing software composition analysis (SCA) tools to inventory dependencies and identify known malicious packages.
- **Isolation/Sandboxing:** Execute third-party code, especially new dependencies, in isolated environments before integrating them into critical production systems.
- **Runtime Monitoring:** Implement runtime application self-protection (RASP) to monitor dynamic code execution, particularly looking for unexpected code execution paths derived from library extension methods.
- **Phased Rollouts:** Avoid immediately integrating new or updated dependencies widely across time-sensitive or critical infrastructure.
## Related Tools/Techniques
- Typosquatting/Dependency Confusion (A related, but distinct, supply chain attack delivery method).
- Logic Bomb malware deployed via other package managers (e.g., npm, PyPI).
- Use of legitimate libraries bundled with malicious code (e.g., `Sharp7Extend` bundling the legitimate Sharp7 library).