Full Report
A newly discovered espionage implant has been using a hijacked Microsoft 365 calendar as its command channel, planting operator instructions and smuggling out stolen files as attachments on calendar events dated to the year 2050. Group-IB, which named the malware HollowGraph, says the approach moves tasking and stolen data through legitimate Microsoft Graph API traffic, so the activity looks
Analysis Summary
# Tool/Technique: HollowGraph
## Overview
HollowGraph is a specialized .NET-based espionage implant designed to utilize legitimate Microsoft 365 services for command-and-control (C2) and data exfiltration. By leveraging the Microsoft Graph API, the malware treats a compromised user's calendar as a "dead drop" for instructions and stolen data, effectively blending malicious traffic with legitimate enterprise SaaS activity.
## Technical Details
- **Type**: Malware family / Espionage Implant
- **Platform**: Windows (.NET environment)
- **Capabilities**: C2 via Microsoft Graph API, data exfiltration through calendar attachments, and DNS-based configuration updates.
- **First Seen**: June 2026 (Reported July 2026)
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- **TA0011 - Command and Control**
- **T1102.002 - Web Service: Bidirectional Communication** (Using MS Graph API/Calendar)
- **T1568.002 - Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms** (Implicit via DNS AAAA records for config)
- **TA0010 - Exfiltration**
- **T1567.002 - Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage**
- **TA0005 - Defense Evasion**
- **T1001 - Data Staging** (Using attachments for smuggling)
- **T1564 - Hide Artifacts** (Dating events to 2050 to avoid user detection)
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
- **Two-Way Dead Drop**: Communicates by querying specific calendar events for tasking and uploading stolen files as attachments to new events.
- **Minimal Command Set**: Supports a streamlined set of operations, primarily `get` (retrieve instructions) and `send` (exfiltrate data).
- **Legitimate Channel Overlays**: Uses legitimate Microsoft Graph API traffic, making the activity indistinguishable from normal M365 operations to many network security tools.
### Advanced Features
- **Temporal Evasion**: Plants C2 calendar events dated to the year 2050 (e.g., May 13, 2050) to ensure they remain hidden from the victim’s current view.
- **DNS-Based Credential Refresh**: Uses IPv6 AAAA records to retrieve updated Entra ID (Azure AD) credentials (tenant ID, client ID, client secret), which it stores in a file named `logAzure.txt`.
- **Hybrid Encryption**: Employs RSA and AES-256 encryption for all data moving through the calendar channel, with distinct key pairs for inbound and outbound traffic.
## Indicators of Compromise
- **File Names**: `logAzure.txt` (Configuration file), `File{n}.txt` (Exfiltration attachments).
- **Network Indicators**: `cloudlanecdn[.]com` (DNS C2 for credential updates).
- **Behavioral Indicators**:
- Calendar events with subjects as bare GUIDs or naming conventions like `Event ID:` or `Boss{..}ID{..}`.
- Frequent AAAA DNS queries for high-entropy subdomains.
- Application-driven modifications to Microsoft 365 calendars.
## Associated Threat Actors
- **Cavern Manticore** (High confidence link via Cavern modular framework).
- **Overlapping Groups**: MuddyWater, Lyceum (associated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security).
## Detection Methods
- **Behavioral Detection**: Monitor Microsoft Graph logs for application-driven calendar creation or attachment uploads, particularly for dates far in the future.
- **DNS Monitoring**: Audit for unusually high volumes of AAAA record queries directed toward a single external domain.
- **Endpoint Hunting**: Search for the presence of `logAzure.txt` and specific .NET DLLs exhibiting Graph API calls.
## Mitigation Strategies
- **Identity Hardening**: Restrict and audit OAuth application permissions; specifically, limit the scope of apps allowed to access the Graph API.
- **App Governance**: Monitor for the creation of new client secrets within Entra ID and implement Conditional Access policies.
- **Credential Hygiene**: Rotate client secrets regularly and use anomalous token detection to identify unauthorized access.
## Related Tools/Techniques
- **Cavern**: A modular C2 framework to which HollowGraph is related.
- **Graphican/Siesta**: Other malware families known to leverage Microsoft Graph API for C2 purposes.