Full Report
Microsoft and CrowdStrike have announced that they are teaming up to align their individual threat actor taxonomies by publishing a new joint threat actor mapping. "By mapping where our knowledge of these actors align, we will provide security professionals with the ability to connect insights faster and make decisions with greater confidence," Vasu Jakkal, corporate vice president at Microsoft
Analysis Summary
# Threat Actor: Specific Actors Mentioned in Taxonomy Alignment
## Attribution & Identity
This summary focuses on the general concept introduced by Microsoft and CrowdStrike: a joint effort to create a shared threat actor glossary to resolve attribution confusion caused by multiple private sector nicknames for the same groups.
**Threat Actor Examples Mentioned:**
* **Midnight Blizzard (formerly Nobelium)**: A Russian state-sponsored threat actor.
* **Aliases**: APT29, BlueBravo, Cloaked Ursa, Cozy Bear, Iron Hemlock, The Dukes.
* **Forest Blizzard (previously Strontium)**: Another threat actor referenced in the context.
* **Aliases**: Blue Athena, BlueDelta, Fancy Bear, Fighting Ursa, FROZENLAKE, Iron Twilight, Pawn Storm, Sednit, Sofacy, TA422.
## Activity Summary
The article describes a strategic collaboration between Microsoft and CrowdStrike to align their individual threat actor taxonomies through a new joint mapping/glossary. This initiative aims to deconflict naming conventions (which have led to confusion) and allow security professionals to connect insights faster. Over 80 adversaries have reportedly been deconflicted through this alignment.
## Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
The article does not detail specific TTPs for any single actor but focuses on the *process* of tracking overlapping activity. The implicit TTP being addressed is **Misattribution/Obfuscation** via varied naming schemes.
- Deconfliction of naming conventions across vendors.
- Implicitly, tracking activity associated with Russian state-sponsored actors (Midnight Blizzard/Forest Blizzard).
## Targeting
Targeting details are only provided in the context of the example actors, who are generally characterized as:
- **Sectors**: Not explicitly detailed, but implied to be high-value targets given the identification of state-sponsored actors.
- **Geography**: Implied targeting associated with Russian state operations (Midnight Blizzard/Forest Blizzard).
- **Victims**: No specific current victims mentioned, only the general capability to better correlate historical or ongoing campaigns.
## Tools & Infrastructure
No specific malware, C2 domains, or IPs are detailed in this summary as the focus is on the naming collaboration itself.
- **Malware families used**: None mentioned.
- **Infrastructure (C2, domains, IPs)**: None mentioned.
## Implications
The main implication is the **reduction of attribution confusion** within the cybersecurity community, which should lead to faster decision-making, greater confidence in threat intelligence, and improved response times by standardizing references for well-known adversaries. The collaboration acts as a "Rosetta Stone" for threat intelligence naming.
## Mitigations
The article focuses on defensive/intelligence organizational mitigation rather than technical remediation:
- Utilize shared industry glossaries (like the one proposed by Microsoft/CrowdStrike) to standardize threat actor identification.
- Monitor for activity associated with established groups like Midnight Blizzard and Forest Blizzard, recognizing their multitude of aliases.
- Participate in industry sharing efforts to enrich attribution data across different telemetry planes.