Full Report
Russian state actor Midnight Blizzard is using fake wine tasting events as a lure to spread malware for espionage purposes, according to Check Point
Analysis Summary
# Threat Actor: Midnight Blizzard (aka Cozy Bear, APT29)
## Attribution & Identity
* **Attribution:** Notorious Russian nation-state actor linked to Russia’s foreign intelligence service (SVR).
* **Aliases:** Cozy Bear, APT29.
## Activity Summary
Midnight Blizzard is currently running a campaign specifically targeting European diplomats. The primary social engineering lure observed involves phishing emails posing as invitations to wine tasting events. The goal of this activity is espionage and intelligence gathering.
## Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
- **Initial Access/Execution:** Deployment of a newly discovered loader named **Grapeloader** via malicious email attachments/links.
- **Execution/Installation:** The Grapeloader ultimately infects victims with a new variant of the modular backdoor **Wineloader**.
- **Collection:** Wineloader is designed to gather sensitive information from compromised devices.
- Specific data points collected include: IP addresses, name of the process it runs on, Windows username, Windows machine name, Process ID, and privilege level.
## Targeting
* **Sectors:** Government, specifically Ministries of Foreign Affairs and embassies.
* **Geography:** European countries.
* **Victims:** European diplomats.
## Tools & Infrastructure
* **Malware Families Used:**
* Grapeloader (Newly discovered loader)
* Wineloader (New variant of the modular backdoor)
* **Infrastructure (C2, domains, IPs):** *No specific URLs or IPs were provided in the available text.*
## Implications
Midnight Blizzard continues its consistent focus on state-level espionage targeting diplomatic entities. The introduction of a new loader (Grapeloader) alongside a familiar backdoor (Wineloader) suggests the actor is actively refreshing toolsets while maintaining long-term intelligence gathering objectives against foreign governments.
## Mitigations
- Heightened vigilance against sophisticated spear-phishing campaigns impersonating social or professional networking opportunities (e.g., wine tasting invitations).
- Strong email filtering and anti-phishing controls to detect malicious attachments or links leading to loader deployment.
- Monitoring for the presence and execution of newly observed loaders like Grapeloader.
- Implementing endpoint detection and response (EDR) capable of identifying lateral movement or reconnaissance behavior typical of data exfiltration post-infection (such as collection of system metadata by malware like Wineloader).