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Join John Strand as he continues his Attack Tactic series this time with the defense ideas for the attacks mentioned in episode 3 (see more here) To see the entire […] The post PODCAST: From Active Countermeasures – Attack Tactics 4 appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Analysis Summary
This article summarizes content from a podcast, focusing on attack tactics and associated defense discussions, specifically referencing Episode 3's topics and external resources regarding specific tools.
# Tool/Technique: CredSniper (Referenced)
## Overview
CredSniper is referenced in connection with stealing Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) tokens, suggesting it is an offensive tool used during red team operations to bypass MFA protections.
## Technical Details
- Type: Tool (Implied security testing tool)
- Platform: Not explicitly stated, but related to stealing 2FA tokens, implying environments using 2FA (e.g., web applications, VPNs).
- Capabilities: Stealing 2FA tokens.
- First Seen: Date not available in the summary, but discussed in connection with a 2018 podcast.
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
*Note: Direct mappings for CredSniper are inferred based on its described function (stealing 2FA tokens).*
- **TA0006 - Credential Access**
- T1555 - Credentials from Memory
- T1555.004 - Credentials from Web Browsers (If tokens are stored in browser sessions)
- **TA0002 - Execution**
- T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter (If used to run post-phishing scripts)
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
- Bypassing or compromising systems protected by Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) by stealing active session tokens.
### Advanced Features
- Specific advanced features are not detailed in this context but are tied to the sophisticated nature of bypassing MFA.
## Indicators of Compromise
- File Hashes: N/A
- File Names: N/A
- Registry Keys: N/A
- Network Indicators: N/A
- Behavioral Indicators: Attempts to harvest or replay session tokens after initial compromise.
## Associated Threat Actors
- Red Teams (Explicitly mentioned in the context of the article discussing its use).
## Detection Methods
- Detection relies heavily on behavioral monitoring for token manipulation or session hijacking attempts.
- Monitoring for unusual session creation or privilege escalation following successful authentication.
## Mitigation Strategies
- Implementing stronger MFA solutions that are resistant to token replay (e.g., FIDO2/WebAuthn).
- Session expiration monitoring and strict controls on where tokens can be used.
## Related Tools/Techniques
- Other token theft tools, session hijacking utilities.
***
# Tool/Technique: Active Countermeasures Framework (Contextual)
## Overview
This entry refers to the overall discussion hosted by Black Hills Information Security (BHIS) with Active Countermeasures regarding "Attack Tactics." The discussion focuses on the defensive strategies corresponding to offensive actions discussed in a prior episode.
## Technical Details
- Type: Conceptual/Framework (Focus on defense post-attack)
- Platform: General security infrastructure (Blue Team focus)
- Capabilities: Providing defensive countermeasures and strategies against known attack tactics.
- First Seen: Ongoing series starting prior to August 2018.
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
*Note: This relates to Defensive strategies, often mapped to the **TA0000 - Defensive Evasion** (if discussing attacker methods) or general **T1562 - Impair Defenses** concepts discussed in detail.*
- **TA0004 - Privilege Escalation** (Defense against techniques used in Episode 3)
- Discussion focuses on mitigating techniques related to this tactic (implied).
- **TA0005 - Defense Evasion**
- Discussion focuses on mitigating evasion techniques.
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
- Analyzing adversary methodologies.
- Developing and discussing actionable defense strategies.
### Advanced Features
- Integrating concepts taught by John Strand and BHIS courses (e.g., SOC Core Skills, Active Defense).
## Indicators of Compromise
- N/A (This refers to the discussion framework, not a specific IOC generator).
## Associated Threat Actors
- N/A (Focus is on defending against all threat actors deploying the discussed tactics).
## Detection Methods
- The podcast promotes tools and training that enhance detection capabilities (e.g., RITA, SOC Core Skills training).
## Mitigation Strategies
- Utilizing the training programs offered by BHIS and Antisyphon (SOC Core Skills, Active Defense & Cyber Deception).
- Utilizing Active Countermeasures' products/approaches (implied by the partnership).
## Related Tools/Techniques
- RITA (Mentioned as a free tool from Active Countermeasures).
- Backdoors & Breaches (Mentioned as a BHIS resource).
***
# Technique: ActiveX Controls in Microsoft Word (Referenced)
## Overview
Techniques involving the misuse of ActiveX controls embedded within Microsoft Word documents are discussed, representing a classic method for executing arbitrary code upon document interaction.
## Technical Details
- Type: Technique (Exploitation of flawed application features)
- Platform: Windows, Microsoft Office
- Capabilities: Allowing remote code execution (RCE) or arbitrary command execution when a malicious document is opened and the user interacts with the control.
- First Seen: Early 2000s (Historically significant technique, though specific exploitation variant date is unknown).
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- **TA0002 - Execution**
- T1204 - User Execution
- T1204.002 - Malicious File
- **TA0005 - Defense Evasion**
- T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information (If controls are hidden/obfuscated)
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
- Embedding executable commands or malicious payloads within a document object model.
- Triggering code execution via user interaction (e.g., opening the document or clicking an element).
### Advanced Features
- Potentially leveraging zero-day or unpatched vulnerabilities in the ActiveX engine, or social engineering to trick users into enabling content.
## Indicators of Compromise
- File Hashes: N/A (Specific to the document/payload)
- File Names: Malicious `.doc` or `.docx` files.
- Registry Keys: N/A
- Network Indicators: Potential callbacks if the embedded code communicates externally.
- Behavioral Indicators: Suspicious process creation originating from `winword.exe` or related Office processes.
## Associated Threat Actors
- Generally applicable to various actors, often seen in targeted phishing campaigns.
## Detection Methods
- Application whitelisting focused on restricting dynamic code execution libraries like ActiveX from running within Office products.
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) monitoring for anomalous child processes spawned by `winword.exe`.
## Mitigation Strategies
- Disabling or severely restricting the use of ActiveX controls in macro-enabled documents via Group Policy or security policies.
- Keeping Microsoft Office suites fully patched.
- User education regarding macro/content warnings.
## Related Tools/Techniques
- Office Macro execution (T1566.001)
- Exploiting embedded object vulnerabilities.