Full Report
An Iraqi member of a pro-Iran hacking collective claimed to have attacked United Nations and international law enforcement organizations’ websites today. While many of the site attacks reported by pro-Iran hackers since the start of the conflict have been focused on Israel and Gulf nations allied with the United States, the Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq –…
Analysis Summary
# Threat Actor: Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq – 313 Team
## Attribution & Identity
* **Identification:** An Iraqi member of a pro-Iran hacking collective.
* **Aliases/Sub-groups:** 313 Team.
* **Known Associations:**
* Part of the **Cyber Islamic Resistance** collective (also referred to as the Islamic Cyber Front).
* **Cyb3r Drag0nz Team:** A Kurdish group that recently reaffirmed a collaborative partnership with the Islamic Cyber Resistance despite previous friction regarding Iranian attacks on Kurdish territory.
## Activity Summary
The actor has recently engaged in a series of highly publicized disruptive operations targeting international organizations and government entities perceived as hostile to Iranian interests or allied with the United States. Recent operations include:
* **Global Law Enforcement/UN Campaign (March 2026):** Claimed attacks on Interpol, Europol, and UNODC.
* **Saudi Government Campaign:** A "massive" operation targeting over 60 IP addresses and internal servers, claiming to impact 70% of government websites.
* **Regional Retaliation:** Previous attacks on the Kuwaiti government and the government of Romania.
## Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
* **Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS):** The primary method used to cause website outages and service disruptions (evident via "time-out errors" and check-host.net screenshots).
* **Infrastructure Targeting:** Moving beyond front-facing websites to target internal servers and specific IP ranges (e.g., Saudi National Data Bank).
* **Psychological Operations (PsyOps):** Utilizing Telegram to post evidence of outages, issue threats, and frame cyber activities as "resistance."
* **MITRE ATT&CK IDs:**
* T1498 (Network Denial of Service)
* T1583.003 (Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Servers for DDoS)
* T1584.005 (Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet)
## Targeting
* **Sectors:** Government, Law Enforcement, International Diplomacy, Information Technology (Cloud Services).
* **Geography:** Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Romania, Germany, Spain, and global international bodies.
* **Victims:**
* **International:** INTERPOL, Europol, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
* **National:** Spanish National Police, Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Saudi Press Agency, Saudi National Data Bank.
* **Private Sector:** Microsoft services (previously claimed).
## Tools & Infrastructure
* **Communication Channels:** Telegram is the primary medium for claims and coordination.
* **Validation Tools:** check-host\[.\]net (used to verify and publicize site outages).
* **Infrastructure:** The group claims the ability to target specific IP blocks (noted targeting 60 IPs of Saudi servers).
## Implications
The 313 Team represents a shift in pro-Iran "hacktivism" from local regional grievances to global geopolitical enforcement. By targeting organizations like INTERPOL and UNODC, the group signals that any entity facilitating international law enforcement or supporting U.S. logistics (as seen with Romania) is a "legitimate target." Their coordination with Kurdish elements (Cyb3r Drag0nz) suggests a consolidation of regional pro-Iran cyber capabilities to maximize operational reach.
## Mitigations
* **DDoS Protection:** Implement robust DDoS mitigation services (e.g., Cloudflare, Akamai) capable of filtering volumetric and application-layer attacks.
* **Geo-blocking/Rate Limiting:** Apply rate limiting to critical login portals and consider geo-blocking traffic from high-risk regions if there is no legitimate business need.
* **IP Shunning:** Proactively monitor and block the 60+ IP ranges identified in the group's Saudi campaign if they appear in reconnaissance logs.
* **Operational Security:** Ensure internal servers (like the Saudi National Data Bank example) are not directly exposed to the internet and are protected behind a VPN or Zero Trust Architecture.